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labor market status matter for wage outcomes. In general, employed members of two-person 
families receive higher wages than employed singles. The model is applied to a welfare 
analysis of alternative unemployment insurance systems, recognizing the role of spousal 
employment as a partial substitute for public insurance. The optimal system involves benefit 
differentiation based on marital status as well as spousal labor market status. Optimal 
differentiation yields small welfare gains but gives rise to large wage differentials. 
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The literature on job search has largely ignored the fact that around every
second labor force participant is a member of a multiple-person household.
This stands in stark contrast to the literatures on consumption, labor supply
and income distributions, where the family perspective is paramount. In this
paper we develop an equilibrium search and matching model of the labor
market where the family perspective stands in focus. Marital status and
the possibility of spousal income sharing generally matter for wage outcomes
when individuals are risk averse and wages are determined through bargain-
ing between workers and ﬁrms. In fact, our model implies wage diﬀerentials
among equally productive workers.
“Large” multiple-person families do feature in some realms of equilib-
rium search and matching theory. A seminal contribution in this genre was
oﬀered by Merz (1995) who studied an economy where each household was
described as “a very large extended family”, where members could perfectly
insure each other against ﬂuctuations in labor income associated with tran-
sitions between employment and unemployment. This approach has been
adopted by others, including Hall and Milgrom (2008) in a recent paper.
The “large family” approach has its virtues, but realism is not one of them.
Modern industrialized economies are largely based on husband-wife families
with at most two adult workers. Transfers across generations may occur
so as to achieve some income smoothing but complete smoothing is utterly
unrealistic. Empirical work has documented that consumption among U.S.
workers falls substantially as unemployment strikes and that the presence of
unemployment insurance markedly reduces the drop in consumption (Gru-
ber, 1997).1
The model we propose appears to be new in the literature. The economy
we study is populated by two types of households, singles and couples. All
household members participate in the labor force and are either employed
or unemployed. Wages are set in a decentralized fashion through worker-
1Gruber (1997) argues that the empirical results “decisively reject the notion that there
are complete private consumption markets for unemployment spells...”
2ﬁrm bargaining. An unemployed worker in a two-person family can beneﬁt
from some consumption insurance through a working spouse, an option that
is not available for singles. This will generally lead to diﬀerent bargaining
outcomes for singles and couples since the outside options diﬀer. Wages will
also diﬀer between ex ante identical members of diﬀerent two-person families
depending on whether the family has one or two employed members.
Our model naturally lends itself to an analysis of optimal unemployment
insurance (UI). The availability of some private income smoothing should
arguably be recognized when designing the optimal UI system. One issue
is whether beneﬁts should be based on individual or family income. When
wages diﬀer across workers, the question of optimal replacement rates also
becomes relevant. For example, does the optimal system involve ﬂat rate
or earnings-related beneﬁts? This issue is related to the debate over “Bis-
marckian” versus “Beveridgean” social insurance schemes; see for example
Casamatta et al (2000) and Goerke (2000).
The paper proceeds by a brief discussion of related literature. Section 3
p r e s e n t st h em o d e l . W es h o wt h a tm a r i t a ls t a t u sa sw e l la ss p o u s a ll a b o r
market status matter for wage outcomes. Section 4 provides a welfare analy-
sis of alternative unemployment insurance systems, recognizing the role of
spousal employment as a partial substitute for public insurance. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
The paper relates to the literature on wage dispersion in frictional labor
markets. The empirical literature has documented that wages vary among
workers with observationally similar characteristics, a fact that has inspired
modeling of frictional wage dispersion. This literature, mainly in the search
and matching tradition, has derived conditions under which wage diﬀerentials
can arise even for workers who are ex ante identical, i.e., identical before
labor force status is determined. The wage-posting model of Burdett and
3Mortensen (1998) is a leading example.2 In their model, job seekers are
ex ante identical but may end up with diﬀerent reservation wages as they
have the option to engage in on-job-search and job-to-job mobility. This
reservation wage heterogeneity creates a tradeoﬀ for ﬁrms: high-wage ﬁrms
a r ea b l et oa t t r a c ta n dr e t a i nm o r ew o r k e r st h a nl o w - w a g eﬁrms are, but
t h er e n tp e rw o r k e rt h a th i g h - w a g eﬁrms can extract is relatively low. Our
paper shows that wage diﬀerentials can arise among workers with identical
ex ante characteristics, such as between workers in two diﬀerent two-person
families where a partner is unemployed in one case and employed in the other.
Spousal employment outcomes matter for bargained wages when risk-averse
spouses practice income sharing.
Another related literature is concerned with the “added worker eﬀect”
and spousal labor supply as insurance. The paper by Burdett and Mortensen
(1978) on labor supply under uncertainty studies job search by couples using
a standard partial equilibrium search framework. When one family member
b e c o m e su n e m p l o y e d ,p a r to ft h ei n c o m el o s sc a nb eo ﬀset by increased
spousal labor supply.3 As shown by Cullen and Gruber (2000), this supply
response may be substantially weakened by unemployment insurance. Our
paper assumes exogenous search intensity and spousal job loss leads to wage
adjustment but no change in search eﬀort. However, an extension of the basic
model to incorporate endogenous search eﬀort would include mechanisms
akin to the added worker eﬀect. An unemployed family member’s search
eﬀort would respond to labor market outcomes of the spouse since those
outcomes inﬂuence overall family income.
The paper also relates to the literature on optimal unemployment insur-
ance design. This literature has focused on issues such as the case for beneﬁt
variation over the spell of unemployment and the interaction between UI and
2See Rogerson et al (2005) for a survey of search models of the labor market.
3Garcia-Perez and Rendon (2004) present an empirical model of family job search and
consumption where spousal interactions are modeled in detail, partly along the lines of
Burdett and Mortensen (1978). The recent paper by Guler et al (2008) studies theoretically
the joint job-search and location problem of a two-person household.
4active labor market policy.4 Most papers have considered economies without
wage dispersion. However, when wages diﬀer across workers, a new issue
arises about the optimal diﬀerentiation of beneﬁts across workers with diﬀer-
ent past or prospective wages. One policy, in the spirit of Beveridge, involves
ﬂat rate beneﬁts. A “Bismarckian” alternative involves instead earnings-
related beneﬁts, thus implying higher beneﬁt levels for workers with high
past or potential wages. We also consider beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation based on
marital status and spousal labor market status. The model is used to pro-
vide welfare assessments of alternative UI systems.
Finally, it is worth noting that numerous empirical studies have docu-
mented the existence of a male marriage wage premium: married males earn
substantially higher wages than unmarried ones (see e.g. Korenman and
Neumark, 1991). Our paper suggests that a marriage premium can arise as a
result of wage bargaining when married persons can eﬀectively wield stronger
bargaining power as a result of intra-family income pooling. However, the
model as it stands does not explain why marriage appears to yield a wage
premium for men but not for women.
3T h e M o d e l
3.1 The Labor Market
The economy is populated by households who are either singles or families
consisting of couples. For concreteness, we will sometimes refer to members
of two-person families as husbands and wives. The individuals have identical
preferences and are equally productive in all ﬁrms. All individuals are labor
f o r c ep a r t i c i p a n t sa n dt h et o t a ll a b o rf o r c ei sﬁxed and normalized to unity.
There are no transitions between marital states so the fraction of singles in
the labor force is constant. Workers are either employed or unemployed and
have inﬁnite time horizons. Time is continuous and an employed worker
is separated from the job at an exogenous Poisson rate .U p o n e n t e r i n g
4See Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) for a survey.
5unemployment, the worker is immediately eligible for (time invariant) UI
beneﬁts.
There are three relevant labor market states for a two-person family:
(i) both spouses employed; (ii) both spouses unemployed; and (iii) one spouse
employed and one spouse unemployed. A family where both spouses are
(un)employed will be referred to as fully (un)employed; a family with mixed
employment status is referred to as partially (un)employed.
A l lu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r sa r ee n g a g e di nj o bs e a r c hw i t ha ne x o g e n o u s
intensity. There is no on-the-job search. The matching function that relates
the aggregate ﬂow of hires to the number of vacancies () and the number
of unemployed () exhibits constant returns to scale:  = ().L e t
 ≡  denote labor market tightness. The probability per unit time that
an individual ﬁnds a job is  = () = ().A l s o ,()=() =
(1) and hence 0()  0; the tighter the labor market, the easier to ﬁnd a
job. Firms ﬁll vacancies at the rate ()=() = (11),a n dt h u s
0()  0; the tighter the labor market, the more diﬃcult to ﬁll a vacancy.
By constant returns to scale, ()=() holds.
The steady state ﬂow equilibrium relationship for this economy can be





This is the aggregate unemployment rate in the economy as well as the un-
employment rate pertaining to singles and couples, respectively. Absent dif-
ferences in search eﬀorts or separation rates across groups, there will be no
group diﬀerences in unemployment rates (or, equivalently, the fraction of
time spent as unemployed). The probability that any given individual is un-
employed is thus given by  and the employment probability is 1 − .T h e
spouses’ probabilities of being (un)employed are independent of each other.
The probability that a couple is fully employed is thus (1 − )2, the proba-
bility of a mixed employment status is 2(1 − ), and the probability that
both spouses are unemployed is 2.
63.2 Households
The individual’s instantaneous utility function is increasing in consumption.
Individuals do not have access to a capital market so consumption equals
income at each instant. Couples practice income sharing at the 50/50 rate
so each spouse receives half of the total family income. The level of con-
sumption varies across individuals in two dimensions, viz. labor market
status (employed vs. unemployed) and marital status (single vs. couple).
For employed singles, average household income is simply the wage, 0;f o r
unemployed singles, income is given by unemployment beneﬁts, .F o rc o u -
ples, there are three possibilities depending on labor market status. If both
spouses are unemployed, average income is ( + )2=; if one spouse is
employed and the other is unemployed, average income is (1 + )2,w h e r e
1 is the wage received by the working spouse; if both spouses are employed,
average income per member is given by (2 + 2)2=2,w h e r e2 is the
wage received by members of a fully employed family. The logic of the wage
notation for couples is that subscript 1 is used if one person is employed and
subscript 2 if two persons are employed.
Wages may diﬀer with respect to marital status and may also diﬀer de-
pending on whether workers belong to fully or partially employed families.
As will be shown, such wage diﬀerentials may arise under Nash bargaining
over wages. For now we proceed under the assumption that beneﬁts are of
the ﬂat rate variety: all unemployed individuals thus receive the same beneﬁt
level, , when unemployed. This may not be an optimal UI system, an issue
to which we will return.




where  denotes consumption (income) and  is the degree of relative risk
aversion,  ≥ 0. Linear utility obtains when  =0and logarithmic utility
when  → 1. The notation for the instantaneous utilities in the various
states are as follows. Unemployed singles as well as unemployed individuals
in wholly unemployed families: (); employed singles: (0);m e m b e r so f
7partially employed families: (1;) or just (1) (recall that average income
in this state is (1+)2); and members of wholly employed families: (2).5
Consider the intertemporal objective functions for singles (superscript )
and couples (superscript ). Let  denote the expected discounted present
value of utility for a single unemployed worker and let  denote the corre-










where  = () and  i st h es u b j e c t i v er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e . T h e s e
two equations imply a present value diﬀerential between employment and







when evaluated at  =0 .
For individuals living in two-person families, the value functions are
slightly non-standard since income sharing implies interdependence between
the spousal valuations: labor market events directly aﬀecting the husband
aﬀect the wife’s consumption, and vice versa. Let  denote the expected
discounted present value of utility for each family member if both spouses
are unemployed,  the value associated with mixed employment status, and
 the corresponding value if both spouses are employed. There are three
5Multiple person households can beneﬁt from economies of scale in consumption, a
possibility that is recognized in studies of income distribution among households of dif-
ferent sizes. The literature has suggested several alternative “equivalence scales” so as
to allow welfare comparisons across diﬀerent family sizes (see Atkinson et al, 1995). The
square root scale is one example. This scale divides household income by the square root
of household size. To get individual size-adjusted income for a two-person family we would
thus divide family income by
√
2 ≈ 14 rather than by 2. I tc a nb es h o w nt h a ts u c ha n
adjustment does not aﬀect equilibrium outcomes or optimal policies in our model.
8relevant value functions for a member of a two-person household:











 = (2)+2 (
 − 
) (7)
Consider the case with two family members unemployed. The husband
(as well as the wife) receives  as instantaneous unemployment compensation.
He ﬁnds a job at the rate , thereby entering partial employment and its
associated present value . The capital gain from such a transition is  −
.H i s w i f e a l s o ﬁnds a job at the rate  and her transition brings her,
as well as her husband, to partial employment with present value .T h e
probability that both spouses simultaneously receive job oﬀe r si sn e g l i g i b l e
in a short time interval. Consider next the case with mixed employment
status (partial unemployment). An unemployed husband ﬁnds a job at the
rate , a transition that is associated with present value . His employed
wife runs the risk  of losing her job, thereby moving the family into full time
unemployment with present value . Finally, the fully employed household
includes spouses who both earn 2. The husband as well as the wife runs the
risk  of being laid oﬀ, thus entering partial unemployment. The probability
that both spouses will simultaneously be laid oﬀ is negligible in a short time
interval.


















(2 + )[(2) − (1)] + [(1) − ()]
2( + )
(9)
Consider eq. (8). The present value diﬀerence between partial and full
unemployment is the discounted value of a weighted average of utility dif-
ferences between partial and full unemployment, (1) − (),a n db e t w e e n
full and partial employment, (2) −(1).T h ew e i g h t sd e p e n do nt h ej o b
ﬁnding rate, , and the job destruction rate, . Note that the value diﬀerence
9− is more heavily aﬀected by the immediate income diﬀerence between
partial and full unemployment, (1) − (), than by the prospective fu-
ture income diﬀerence between full and partial employment, (2) − (1).
Analogous interpretations hold for eq. (9).
3.3 Firms
Firms operate under constant returns to labor, an assumption that allow us
t ot r e a tt h ej o ba st h es t a n di nf o rt h eﬁrm (Pissarides, 2000). Workers and
jobs are randomly matched, implying that the ﬁrm with some probability
will encounter a worker from a single-person household, a worker from a
wholly unemployed family, or a worker from a partially employed family.
These three categories of workers may earn diﬀerent wages. Let  denote the
constant level of labor productivity, uniform across ﬁrms and workers, 0 the
present discounted value of job occupied by a single-household worker , 1
the value of a job occupied by a worker from a partially employed family, and
2 the value of a job matched to a member of a wholly employed family. The
value of opening a vacancy is denoted  . The value functions pertaining to
occupied jobs are written as:
0 =  − 0 + ( − 0) (10)
1 =  − 1 + ( − 1)+(2 − 1) (11)
2 =  − 2 + ( − 2)+(1 − 2) (12)
where  here stands for the rate of interest, by assumption equal to the
individual’s subjective rate of time preference.
Eq. (10) is the standard job valuation function with one type of worker
and no wage diﬀerences. The ﬁrm’s instantaneous surplus is given by −0
a n dt h ej o bi sd e s t r o y e da tt h ee x o g e n o u sr a t e.E q s .( 1 1 ) a n d ( 1 2 ) a r e
non-standard and capture worker interdependencies in two-person families.
Consider eq. (11). A job occupied by a worker from a partially employed
family is destroyed at the rate , just as a job occupied by a worker from a
single-person household. However, there is also a possibility that the worker’s
10unemployed spouse will ﬁnd a job, an event that triggers a wage renegoti-
ation. The spouse encounters and accepts job oﬀers at the rate ,c a u s i n g
a change in the present value of the job equal to 2 − 1. The third value
function, eq. (12), states that the value of a job occupied by a worker from
a wholly employed family runs two types of risks. There is a risk that the
job itself is destroyed, an event that occurs at the rate .T h e r ei sa l s oar i s k
that the employed worker’s spouse is hit by a job destruction in her ﬁrm;
this event also strikes at the rate . T h i ss p o u s a lj o bl o s sl e a d st ow a g e
renegotiation and therefore a change in the value of the job.
The solutions of the value functions, evaluated at  =0and  =0(free












[ − (1 +( 1− )2)];  ∈ (01) (15)
where  ≡ 2(+2),  ≡ (+2),a n d2 −1 =( 1 − 2)( +2 ).
The value of an occupied job is given as the discounted present value of the
surplus. Note that the average wage cost pertaining to employed couples is
given as a weighted average of the wages for members of partially and wholly
employed families, 1 and 2.
It remains to consider the value of opening a vacancy. The ﬂow value of
keeping a vacancy is denoted  and the ﬁrm meets unemployed job seekers
at the rate (). The probability that a job seeker is single is given by the
fraction of singles in the population, ; the probability of ﬁnding a married
seeker is thus 1 − . Upon encountering a married job seeker, the probabil-
ity that he or she belongs to a wholly unemployed family is  whereas the
probability of coming from partial employment is 1 − . The value function
takes the form
 = − + ()[0 +( 1− )(1 +( 1− )2) −  ] (16)
11which can be rewritten as




w h e r ef r e ee n t r y , =0 , is imposed along with eqs. (13), (14) and (15). Note
also that  = () as given by (1). The left-hand side of (17) is the excess
of the marginal product of labor over expected wage costs. In equilibrium,
this surplus equals the expected capitalized value of the vacancy cost, i.e.,
().S i n c e0()  0 and 0()  0, the job creation condition provides a
relationship between tightness and each of the three wage rates. A suﬃcient
(but not necessary) condition for   0=0 12 is 2 ≥ 1.
3.4 Wage Bargaining
Wages are determined by decentralized worker-ﬁrm Nash bargaining. As
usual in these models, the relevant threat point for the single worker is the
value of unemployment, .L e t  ∈ (01) denote the worker’s bargaining




 (0 −  )
1−







For workers in two-person families, there are two cases to consider. A
worker from a partially employed family has continued unemployment as the




 (1 −  )
1−







The threat point for a worker from a wholly employed family is diﬀerent
since income sharing cushions the income loss associated with failure to strike
12a bargain. We assume that each spouse acts on her own, taking the partner’s
wage, ˜ 2, as given. Instantaneous income associated with disagreement is
given by ( + 1)2 rather than  and the relevant threat point is thus given




 (2 −  )
1−







The magnitude of a worker’s instantaneous marginal utility of a wage in-
crease, (),  =0 12, plays a crucial role for wage outcomes. For a
single worker, we have (0)0 =1for linear utility and (0)0 =
10 for log utility. For a worker in a partially employed family we get
(1)1 =1 2 for linear and (1)1 =1 ( + 1) for log utility.
Finally, for workers in wholly employed families we have (2)2 =1 2
for linear and (2)2 =1 22 for log utility when evaluated at a sym-
metric equilibrium with 2 =˜ 2.I ti sc l e a rf r o mt h eﬁrst-order conditions
that an increase in the marginal utility of a wage hike is analogous to an
increase in the worker’s relative bargaining power, i.e., (1 − ).
3.5 Equilibrium
All the ingredients of the model are now in place. There are 11 endogenous
variables:    −   −   −  0 1 2 0 1 2.T h e
relevant equations are (1), (4), (8), (9), (13), (14), (15), (17) — (20). To solve
the model it is useful to focus on the job creation condition along with the
three wage bargaining equations. The latter three equations, stated in (18),
(19) and (20), can after relevant substitutions be written as
131
 + 








(2)+2 (1) − ( +2 )()
2( + )2 =
ˆ 





( +2 )(2) − 2(1) − ()
2( + )2 =
ˆ 





where ˆ  = (1 − ) measures the worker’s relative bargaining power,
 =2 ( +2 ),  = 2 and  = ().E q s .( 2 1 ) — ( 2 3 ) , i m p o s i n g a
symmetric equilibrium with 2 =˜ 2 along with the job creation condition
(17), determine  0 1 and 2. Unemployment is obtained from (1) once
tightness is determined. The numerical versions of the model that we have
considered always deliver unique equilibria.6
3.6 Wage Diﬀerentials
Consider wage outcomes for the three types of workers, viz. a worker from
a single-person household, a worker from a partially employed family, and
a worker from a wholly employed family. It is useful to begin with linear
utility functions in which case we obtain closed form solutions for the wage
equations, i.e., bargained wages as functions of (endogenous) tightness and








  =0 12 (24)
Bargained wages are given as weighted averages of productivity and beneﬁts.
The weight on productivity is increasing in tightness which implies that wages
are increasing in tightness since  . It is immediately obvious that wages
are independent of marital status and spousal labor market status. Hence:
6With isoelastic utility and risk aversion (0), 0 is required.
14Proposition 1 Equilibrium in the family search model entails no wage dis-
persion among equally productive risk-neutral workers.
To get some intuition for the role of risk aversion, consider a special
case of our model where one spouse (the “breadwinner”) is permanently
employed earning the wage , whereas the other spouse (the “secondary
worker”) is moving back and forth between employment and unemployment.
The breadwinner’s wage eﬀectively functions as a state-independent income
subsidy to the secondary worker in the family. The instantaneous utility







1− − ( + )
1−¤
(25)
where  ≤ 0 as  ≥ 0 and  . With log utility we have  =
ln( + ) − ln( + ) and  =(  + )−1 − ( + )−1  0.A h i g h e r
breadwinner wage reduces the utility diﬀerence between employment and
unemployment when the utility function is strictly concave. This implies a
decrease in the surplus from agreement and thus stronger incentives for a
wage increase.
However, the impact of the subsidy on the negotiated wage depends also
on the marginal utility of a wage hike, i.e., () =(  + )−.T h i s
marginal utility is decreasing in  for 0 so a higher breadwinner wage
entails incentives for wage moderation via this mechanism; there is obvi-
ously zero impact if  =0 . With log utility, the wage moderation eﬀect is
dominated by the wage push eﬀect, i.e.,   0.7 T h eb o t t o ml i n ei s
that state-independent income supplements matter for wage outcomes when
individuals are risk averse but they do not matter under risk neutrality.
Wage outcomes in our model are driven by the worker’s surplus from
agreement as well as by the marginal utility to the worker of a wage hike,
7Too verify this claim, consider the ﬁrst-order condition
1
 + 







and diﬀerentiate with respect to  and ,h o l d i n g() constant.
15i.e., (),  =0 12. Consider log utility and assume for a mo-
ment that wage equality prevails, i.e., 0 = 1 = 2 = .W ew o u l d t h e n
have (0)0 =1  for singles, (1)1 =1 ( + ) for partially
employed families, and (2)2 =1 2 for wholly employed families.
Hence the following inequalities would apply (for  ): (0)0 
(1)1   (2)2. The marginal utility of a wage hike would be
highest for a worker from a single-person household. Moreover, the mar-
ginal utility of a wage hike would be higher for partially employed families
than from wholly employed families. All else equal, these inequalities would
suggest 0  1  2.
All else are, of course, not equal. The worker’s surplus from a wage agree-
ment varies by marital status and spousal labor market status. Two-person
households can beneﬁt from partial income insurance via spousal transfers
and such transfers will presumably reduce the utility diﬀerence between em-
ployment and unemployment and thereby increase wage pressure. It appears
diﬃcult to give precise general characterizations of wage diﬀerentials but it
turns out that overall wage equality is incompatible with equilibrium. To
prove this claim, assume 0 = 1 = 2 =  a n dc h e c kw h e t h e ra ne q u l i b -
rium exists under these assumptions. Use (21) and (22) to substitute out
 − and deﬁne  ≡  as the replacement rate. The resulting expression
boils down to
2[ln(1 + ) − ln2] = ln (26)
which has no meaningful solution since    for  ∈ (01).W e
have  ∈ (−2ln20) and  ∈ (−∞0) for  ∈ (01). Hence:
Proposition 2 Equilibrium in the family search model entails wage disper-
sion among equally productive risk-averse workers.
To examine spousal wage diﬀerences we proceed analogously. Assume













16w h e r ew eh a v ei n v o k e d()=(1 − ). A meaningful solution to this
equation requires an implausibly low replacement rate. The RHS of (27) must
be positive but a postive sign obtains only for 01373. Consistency with
realistic unemployment rates in a range between 5 and 10 percent requires
even lower replacement rates. Wage equality between spouses is thus a highly
unlikely outcome.
We have used a calibrated version of the model to examine wage and
employment outcomes when individuals are risk averse; see Appendix 1. The
baseline calibration involves a log utility function and a beneﬁt/output ratio
of one half,  =0 5, which implies replacement rates slightly greater than
50 percent. (With ﬂat rate beneﬁts and wage diﬀerentials, replacement rates
will of course vary across groups.) Output per worker is normalized to unity,
 =1 . The baseline features an unemployment rate of 6 percent. Table 1
shows how wages and unemployment vary by relative risk aversion. Wages
are ranked as 1  2  0. Thus employed family members receive higher
wages than employed singles and workers in partially employed families earn
more than workers in wholly employed families. The magnitudes of the wage
diﬀerentials increase as risk aversion increases. With relatively high risk
aversion ( =2 ), workers in partially employed two-person families earn
4.5 percent higher wages than working singles. Two-person families can
provide partial income insurance to its members, a fact that contributes to
higher wage pressure by reducing the utility surplus of employment relative
to unemployment.
Table 1. The impact of risk aversion.
 =0  =1 2  =1  =2
0 0969 0956 0962 0954
1 0969 0980 0988 0998
2 0969 0968 0968 0967
ln(10) 0 0015 0027 0045
ln(20) 0 0003 0006 0014
ln(21) 0 −0012 −0021 −0031
 0066 0063 0060 0054
17A noteworthy feature of our model is that the shares of singles and couples
in the population matter for unemployment and wage diﬀerentials. Singles
have no access to spousal income insurance, a fact that suggests that unem-
ployment would fall if the share of singles () increases. Indeed, this is what
the numerical analysis conﬁrms. An increase in  from 03 to 07 leads to a
decline in unemployment from 61 to 59 percent.
3.7 The Impact of Beneﬁts
To understand how beneﬁts aﬀe c tw a g eo u t c o m e s ,c o nsider the three bar-
gaining equations as given by (21), (22) and (23). As usual and as is clear
from (21), a uniform rise in beneﬁts reduces the single worker’s surplus from
agreement and this tends to lead to a wage increase. From (23) it follows that
the same mechanism operates for workers in wholly employed families. The
incentives are however less clear for workers in partially employed families.
E x a m i n ee q .( 2 2 )a n dn o t et h a tab e n e ﬁti n c r e a s eh a ss e v e r a le ﬀects. First,
t h e r ei st h ec o n v e n t i o n a le ﬀect operating via () which reduces the worker’s
surplus from agreement and thus triggers an increase in wage pressure. Sec-
ond, there are two eﬀects operating via (1;):( )ar i s ei n is akin to
an in-work subsidy which increases average income and thus (1;) for the
partially employed family, an eﬀect which tends to oﬀset part of the con-
ventional impact; ()ar i s ei n also reduces the marginal utility of a wage
increase via (1;)1, a fact that encourages wage moderation. All in
a l l ,t h e r ea r en or e a s o n st oe x p e c tt h a tu n i f o r mb e n e ﬁt increases should have
uniform wage eﬀects. It is conceivable that beneﬁt increases actually will
encourage wage moderation among workers in partially employed families.
This conjecture is conﬁrmed by the numerical exercises reported in Table 2:
1 decreases when  increases whereas 0 and 2 increases.8
8The experiments in Table 2 and Table 3 ignore the government’s budget restriction,
but the broad features of the results carry over to the case when beneﬁts are fully ﬁnanced
by taxes on wages.
18Table 2. The impact of uniform beneﬁt changes.
 =0 4  =0 5  =0 6
0 0956 0962 0968
1 0990 0988 0986
2 0964 0968 0971
ln(10) 0035 0027 0018
ln(20) 0009 0006 0004
ln(21) −0026 −0021 −0015
 0053 0060 0069
For reasons discussed above, the impact of selective beneﬁtc h a n g e sa r e
likely to be diﬀerent from the results shown in Table 2. Let 1 denote the ben-
eﬁt level for an unemployed individual in partially unemployed families (one
unemployed person) and 2 the beneﬁt level for wholly unemployed couples
(two unemployed persons). The value functions are slightly modiﬁed when
beneﬁts are diﬀerentiated; see Appendix 2. Table 3 presents some numeri-
cal comparative statics on selective beneﬁt changes based on our calibrated
model. When 1 is varied, beneﬁts for singles and wholly unemployed couples
are ﬁxed at the baseline value, 0 = 2 =0 5.W h e n2 is varied, the other
beneﬁt levels are analogously ﬁxed. It is clear that an increase in 1 leads
to strong wage moderation among workers in partially employed families,
reﬂecting the fact that 1 is analogous to an in-work subsidy. However, an
increase in 2 increases wage pressure among those workers.9
9We note that  =1 1 holds in some cases. 1  0 still holds; what matters for the
value of an occupied job is the average wage cost relative to productivity as given by eq.
(14).
19Table 3. The impact of selective beneﬁt changes.
1 =0 4 1 =0 6 2 =0 4 2 =0 6
0 0963 0962 0963 0961
1 1046 0931 0927 1043
2 0962 0973 0967 0968
ln(10) 0083 −0032 −0038 0082
ln(20) 00002 0012 0004 0008
ln(21) −0083 0045 0042 −0075
 0059 0061 0058 0062
We proceed by applying our model to an analysis of optimal unemploy-
ment insurance. When wages diﬀer among workers, issues concerning the
optimal structure of beneﬁts become interesting. Should higher wages also
motivate higher unemployment beneﬁts?
4 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
4.1 Alternative UI Schemes
Unemployment insurance schemes diﬀer markedly across countries. One al-
ternative, often referred to as Beveridgean, involves ﬂat rate beneﬁts, i.e.,
identical beneﬁt levels for all unemployed individuals. Another system,
known as Bismarckian, entails earnings-related beneﬁts and thus higher ben-
eﬁt levels for individuals with higher pre-unemployment earnings. Existing
schemes typically diﬀer from the polar types in various ways. One preva-
lent scheme has borrowed features from both Beveridge and Bismarck and
involve a ﬁxed replacement rate up to an earnings threshold and a constant
beneﬁt level for earnings above this threshold. The UI schemes also diﬀer
with regard to the treatment of family income and individual income as the
basis for beneﬁt levels.
Our model can be employed to shed light on the welfare aspects of some
of these issues. We have so far mainly focused on ﬂat rate beneﬁts but we
will now also consider alternatives where beneﬁt levels diﬀer depending on
20previous earnings. One alternative is the Bismarckian one, i.e., a scheme with
constant replacement rates. Another alternative involves optimal diﬀerentia-
tion of beneﬁtl e v e l s .B e n e ﬁtd i ﬀerentiation may be based on marital status
as well as spousal labor market status. An analysis of optimal UI design also
requires explicit treatment of taxes needed to ﬁnance the beneﬁts.
Notations and deﬁnitions are as follows. Flat rate beneﬁts are denoted 
(as before). The beneﬁt level for singles who are unemployed is denoted 0;
the beneﬁt level for unemployed individuals in partially (un)employed fami-
l i e si sd e n o t e d1;a n dt h eb e n e ﬁt level for individuals in wholly unemployed











where  is the common replacement rate. The logic of our deﬁnition for
couples is as follows. The immediate unemployment risk facing an individual
in a wholly employed family with the wage 2 is partial unemployment asso-
ciated with beneﬁtl e v e l1; the fraction replaced income is thus 12.T h e
immediate unemployment risk facing an employed individual in a partially
employed family with the wage 1 is the risk of entering the state of being
wholly unemployed and then receive 2; the replacement rate is 21.
We also need to specify the social welfare function and the mode of beneﬁt
ﬁnancing. The social welfare function is taken to be utilitarian. To simplify
the analysis and to allow comparisons of steady states without considering
adjustment paths, we let the discount rate approach zero and obtain the
objective function as a weighted average of individual per-period expected
utilities:








(1 − )[2(1 − )(1;1)]
where we have used the fact the spouses’ probabilities of being (un)employed
are independent of each other. The probability that any given individual is
unemployed is  and the employment probability is 1 − . The probability
21that a couple is fully employed is (1−)2; the probability that both spouses
are unemployed is 2; and the probability of a mixed employment status is
2(1 − ).
We assume that beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a proportional wage tax on ﬁrms.
T h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o nt h u st a k e st h ef o r m




where  i st h ew a g et a x .T a xr e v e n u e sa r e
 = {(1 − )0 +( 1− )
£




and government expenditure on beneﬁts is given by
 = 0 +( 1− )
£




We compare four policies. The benchmark case is optimal choice of ﬂat
rate beneﬁts subject to the market equilibrium relationships and the gov-
ernment’s budget restriction, i.e.,  = . The second case involves optimal
choice of three beneﬁt levels (0 1 2) but subject to a replacement rate
restriction of the form given by (28). The third case entails beneﬁtd i f -
ferentiation based on marital status but without recognizing spousal labor
market status. Singles thus receive 0 whereas unemployed couples receive
1 = 2 = . The fourth case involves optimal choice of three beneﬁtl e v e l s
(0 1 2), thus recognizing marital status as well as spousal labor market
status and with no replacement rate restriction imposed. Appendix 3 shows
how the bargaining equations are modiﬁed when wage taxes are introduced.
4.2 Numerical Results
The results are displayed in Table 4 for log utility; the results for higher
risk aversion ( =2 ) are broadly similar. The welfare eﬀect of a speciﬁc
UI regime is measured relative to the ﬂat rate benchmark. It is expressed
as the equivalent of a consumption tax that equalizes welfare across policy
regimes. Let Λ represent welfare associated with the benchmark and Λ
22welfare associated with an alternative policy. The measure of the welfare
gain of policy  relative to policy  is given by the value of the tax rate 
that solves Λ [(1 − );·]=Λ. With logarithmic utility functions we have
∆Λ ≡ Λ−Λ = −ln(1−) ≈ . We also show welfare gains separately for
singles (∆Λ) and couples (∆Λ), where
Λ
 =  ()+( 1− )(0) (32)
Λ
 =( 1 − )
2(2)+
2(2)+2 (1 − )(1;1) (33)
and ∆Λ =( ∆Λ + ∆Λ)2.
The optimal ﬂat beneﬁt level implies a replacement rate close to 50 per-
cent. A replacement rate restriction leads to a slight decrease in welfare
compared to ﬂat rate beneﬁts (column 2). Beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation with re-
spect to marital status (column 3) implies that singles should receive higher
beneﬁts than couples: the optimal system involves a replacement rate close
to 60 percent for singles and 33 percent for couples. Since singles do not
have access to partial income insurance, it is to be expected that they should
receive higher beneﬁts than couples. Diﬀerentiation with respect to marital
status also entails a substantial welfare gain for singles amounting to over 2
percent of consumption. However, there is also a welfare loss for couples of
a l m o s tt h es a m em a g n i t u d es ot h eo v e r a l lw e l f a r eg a i nr e l a t i v et oﬂat rate
beneﬁts is negligible.
We ﬁnally examine optimal diﬀerentiation by marital status as well as
spousal labor market status (column 4). The optimal beneﬁt levels vary
substantially and the implied wage diﬀerentials are also large. Beneﬁts for
partially unemployed families (1) are more than ﬁve times larger than the
beneﬁts for wholly unemployed families (2). Recall that an increase in 1
is akin to an in-work subsidy and leads to wage moderation rather than in-
creased wage pressure. Indeed, there is a huge decline in 1 accompanying
the rise in 1. This wage decline contributes to sharply increasing wage dif-
ferences between workers from families with and without employed spouses.
T h ei n c r e a s ei n1 and fall in 1 imply that overall consumption among par-
tially employed families, ( + 1)2, decreases only marginally with optimal
diﬀerentiation relative to ﬂat rate beneﬁts. All in all, optimal diﬀerentiation
23with respect to both marital status and labor market status has large eﬀects
on wage diﬀerentials but small eﬀects on overall welfare.
Table 4. Welfare comparisons of alternative UI schemes, log utility.
Flat rate Constant Diﬀerentiation Optimal
beneﬁts replacement rate by marital status diﬀerentiation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 0464
 0494
0 0460 0561 0582
1 0478 0311 0881
2 0464 0311 0151
1+1
2 0711 0709 0632 06053
ln(10) 0029 0038 0012 −0785
ln(20) 0007 0007 −0016 0011




00 0494 0594 0626
21 0494 0326 0356
12 0494 0335 0937
 0059 0059 0058 0057
 0031 0031 0028 0047
∆Λ (%) −010 237 120
∆Λ (%) 008 −222 −101
∆Λ (%) −001 008 009
24The Insurance Value of the Family
Singles have no access to family income sharing and would be willing to
pay something in order to have access to a family as an insurance institution.
How much would they be willing to pay? We follow the approach above
and compare expected utilities for singles and couples, Λ and Λ,w h e r e
employment and wage outcomes are evaluated at the utilitarian planner’s
solution. The diﬀerence ∆ ≡ Λ− Λ is a measure of the welfare gain
associated with being member of a two-person family (ignoring non-pecuniary
beneﬁts). For log utility and ﬂat rate beneﬁts (i.e. column 1, Table 3), this
gain amounts to 1.4 percent; that is, singles would be willing to pay 1.4
percent of their consumption in order to switch family status. The gains are
of the same order of magnitude for the other UI schemes. The welfare of
being in a two-person family is substantially larger if we also take economies
of scale into account. Using square-root scale we divide all family income
by
√
2 instead of two. The welfare gain associated with being member of a
family is then 36 percent: singles would thus be willing to pay 36 percent of
their consumption to switch family status.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of family job search with individual wage bar-
gaining and examined the implications for equilibrium wage diﬀerentials and
optimal unemployment insurance. Equilibrium wage diﬀerentials arise among
risk-averse individuals who are ex ante identical. In general, there is a wage
premium for workers in two-person households compared to singles when the
UI system involves ﬂat rate beneﬁts or constant replacement rates. The wage
diﬀerentials are however sensitive to beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiations based on marital
status and spousal labor market status. The optimal UI system entails very
high beneﬁts for unemployed spouses in partially employed families and very
low wages for the working spouses in such families.
Several extensions of the model are conceptually straightforward. For
example, it would be possible to introduce endogenous search eﬀort, an ex-
25tension that probably will predict unemployment diﬀerences between singles
and couples. Our current version of the model with exogenous search eﬀort
is eﬀectively imposing identical search eﬀorts across groups, an assumption
implying that unemployment rates are independent of marital status.
We have assumed income sharing in the family at the 50/50 rate, equiva-
lent to assuming equal within-family bargaining power for the spouses. It is
likely that allowing for gender diﬀerences in within-family bargaining power
will lead to gender diﬀerences in labor market outcomes. The model as it
stands is silent about gender wage diﬀerentials and it cannot explain the
empirical ﬁnding that there is a marriage premium for males but not for
females.
The family institution provides some protection against income losses
and the optimal UI design should arguably take this feature into account.
However, our numerical analysis of alternative UI systems gives little support
for non-standard alternatives to ﬂat rate beneﬁts. It remains to be seen
whether the results still hold when allowing for endogenous search eﬀort as
another margin whereby beneﬁts aﬀect wages and unemployment.
Finally, it is noteworthy that so little of empirical work on search and
unemployment has taken the family perspective seriously. It would be sur-
prising if this omission were of no relevance for understanding labor market
outcomes for family members.
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27APPENDIX 1
A Numerical Model
Assume that preferences are given by a logarithmic utility function. The
time period is taken to be a quarter and the quarterly job destruction rate
is set to 7 percent:  =0 07. The rate of interest (equal to the rate of
time preference) is set to zero. The matching function is Cobb Douglas,
 = 1−,w h e r e =0 5 is assumed (roughly consistent with most
empirical studies). Productivity is normalized to unity:  =1 .F l a t r a t e
beneﬁts are ﬁxed at 50 percent of productivity:  =0 5. The fraction of
singles, ,i ss e tt o05.10The matching parameter, , and the vacancy cost,
, are chosen so as to obtain 6 percent unemployment and a reasonably
realistic relationship between the expected duration of vacancies, 1(),a n d
the expected duration of unemployment, 1(). (The duration of vacancies
is empirically much shorter than the the duration of unemployment.) We set
 =2and chose a value of  that gives 6 percent unemployment:  =1 8.
Table A1 presents some output implied by these parameter choices.
Table A1. A numerical model, log utility.
 0299
 0060
Vacancy duration (weeks) 355







10According to the US Census, 50 percent of the US population (15+) are married with
spouse present in 2008.
28APPENDIX 2
Value Functions with Diﬀerentiated Beneﬁts
Consider the intertemporal objective functions when beneﬁts may diﬀer
across marital status and labor market states (wholly unemployed versus















when evaluated at  =0 . For couples we have











 = (2)+2 (
 − 
)









(2 + )[(2) − (1)] + [(1;1) − (2)]
2( + )2
29APPENDIX 3
Wage Bargaining with Taxes
Payroll taxes are levied on ﬁrms in order to ﬁnance UI beneﬁts. This












[ − (1 +( 1− )2)];  ∈ (01)
where  = (1 + ) i st h ew a g ec o s ti n c l u s i v eo ft h et a xr a t e.N a s h















2 (1 + )
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